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Summary 
 
This report represents the first part of a project targeting the problems and 
prospects of two economic integration projects in Greater Europe — the European 
project (European Union) and the Eurasian project (Russia, the Customs Union and 
the Eurasian Economic Union). This topic is particularly relevant in light of the 
Ukrainian crisis, the signing of Association Agreements with the EU by Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine, as well as the looming threat of „continental fracture‟. 
The presented study pays particular attention to the EU‟s Eastern 
Partnership, Ukraine‟s gains and losses stemming from its internal crisis and 
implications of its “European choice”, and the implications of this choice for 
Moldova. The authors have tried to maintain a position „above politics‟ and focus 
on the economic and financial issues. The aggregate results and calculations as 
well as the underlying methodologies are substantiated in the full text of the report, 
which is available in Russian
1
. Apart from statistical analysis and various 
calculations on trade and investment flows, an IMF-style financial programming 
has been made to properly assess the financial requirement for Ukraine‟s 
development.  
The authors plan to expand the list of issues for analysis, including those 
concerning Russia and the Eurasian economic project, and to spell out in more 
detail the possible drawbacks for Russia and the Customs Union (CU) given the 
realities of the new situation arising from the “European choice” of a number of 
states in the post-Soviet space. Nevertheless, the work already done, with 
calculations limited to the period of 2014—2018, allows for the following 
conclusions. 
In order to overcome the crisis in Ukraine and the accompanying fractures in 
the European region, it is necessary to create a new platform for cooperation in 
Europe. The policies of the Eastern Partnership and Eurasian economic integration 
require serious corrections.  
                                                 
1 Е. Винокуров, С. Кулик, А. Спартак, И. Юргенс. Тупик борьбы интеграций в Европе. 
М., 2014, 117 с. http://www.insor-russia.ru/files/INSOR20140620.pdf 
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For covering its budget and balance of payments deficit as well as servicing 
external debt in 2014, Ukraine requires nearly $30 billion in aid in the case of the 
inertia (moderate) scenario within a single year and more than $50 billion in the 
case of the negative scenario. In the inertia scenario the country needs $85 billion 
to cover its current balance of payments deficit in order to stabilize its economy 
from 2015 to 2018. 
Satisfying the need for development requires financing of a different order 
of magnitude: $190 billion through 2018 in order to provide for the necessary 
capitalization of the economy. A sum of $300 billion must be found in order to 
seriously address the structural imbalances which have accumulated in the 
economy over the past 20 years. 
In case of a further worsening of economic relations with Russia and the 
Customs Union, Ukraine‟s losses could amount to approximately $33 billion 
annually in the next years to come, which represents 19% of Ukraine‟s GDP in 
2013. 
The losses for Moldova stemming from two key factors — the reduction in 
export revenues and lower remittances from migrant workers — are estimated at 
$1.5—1.6 billion annually, which represents 20% of Moldova‟s GDP in 2013.  
The drawbacks of participating in the Eastern Partnership in its current 
format are great for both Ukraine and Moldova. Moreover, they are unacceptable 
for the European Union as well, as the EU is taking full responsibility for the fates 
of these countries, which will require expenditures and efforts comparable to the 
measures taken to overcome the EU‟s own sovereign debt crisis, which threatened 
the future of the European project. However, this time the threat comes from 
countries which will not in the foreseeable future become full-fledged participants 
of this project. 
The drawbacks are also very perceptible for Russia and the recently formed 
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). According to preliminary calculations in case of 
the negative scenario the possible direct lump-sum looses for Moscow, including 
mainly from Kiev‟s hard measures against Russian financial assets, are estimated 
to be $55—60 billion.  
The optimal solution is to build an interconnected package of agreements 
between three parties: the EU, the countries of the Eastern Partnership (most 
importantly, Ukraine) and the Eurasian Economic Union. Such a solution should 
be focused on deeper and comprehensive integration agreements which embrace 
the interested parties within a common European economic area stretching from 
Lisbon to Vladivostok. 
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The EU’s Post-Soviet Project  
The Eastern Partnership (EaP) is a key component of the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) with 6 post-Soviet states (Azerbaijan, Armenia, 
Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus) participating. The other part of the ENP 
includes 10 Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia). The institutionalization of the 
Eastern Partnership began at the initiative of Poland and Sweden and was 
reinforced by a declaration on the establishment of the EaP at a special summit in 
Prague in 2009. At the same time, the declared „privileged relations‟ do not imply 
possible EU membership but rather are limited to the format of „association‟.  
The Association Agreement (AA) is selected as the core agreement 
framework for these relations. As the EU documents indicate, the aim of the AA is 
political association and economic integration between the EU and the partner 
country in order to facilitate the creation of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Area (DCFTA).  
The EU leadership unwaveringly intends to continue its EaP program in the 
new situation. This intention is reflected in the budget for the 2014—2020 
financial cycle. The ENP has been allocated €15.5 billion, which is somewhat 
larger than the sum allocated in the previous 7-year period (€11.2 billion), of which 
the countries of the EaP received only 30%, with the Mediterranean countries 
taking the lion‟s share. These proportions will remain in place going forward, with 
the EaP getting approximately €5 billion of the funds during the current cycle. 
Although these allocations may at first seem insignificant compared to the 
budget of Brussels, the European Union also has major global financial obligations 
and remains a leading international donor to various joint development programs 
with outside countries. In 2012 alone the amount of foreign aid for these purposes 
originating from the EU and its member-states totaled €55.7 billion.  
What is more important is that the EU has set a rather high ceiling for 
expenditures on its own development in light of strategies in effect through the 
year 2020. In current prices the EU budget for 2014—2020 slightly exceeds €1 
trillion. Compared to the budget for 2007—2013, over the next 7-year period the 
funds allocated for the EU‟s own development are increasing. It is no surprise that 
due to the conflict situation in the EaP zone, there are high hopes for greater 
engagement of international financial structures and EU allies in aiding Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine, in particular. In light of the crisis in Ukraine and the 
complicated domestic political situation in Moldova, Brussels would be highly 
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interested in accelerating the implementation of the EaP with these countries for 
the demonstrative effect of underscoring the correctness of the “European choice”. 
All of this is bound to create an additional financial burden for the EU, and the real 
size of this burden has yet to be fully spelled out. 
It should also be noted that in this new situation due to the Ukrainian crisis 
the calculations made earlier concerning the gains and losses stemming from the 
DCFTA have lost their relevance. Moreover, relatively little sound work has been 
done on this issue with the use of mathematical modeling and statistical 
computations. In the studies the advantages of the DCFTA are predominantly 
projected to emerge only in the long-term perspective. For example, it has been 
suggested that in some remote future period Ukraine would see GDP growth of 
more than 5%. Brussels continues to cite this forecast without acknowledging that 
the corresponding calculations are now irrelevant. Many researchers have also 
calculated that the dividends for the EU would be rather small and significantly 
less than for the partners of the EaP program. 
Regarding the immediate future, most calculations have indicated that the 
population of the countries signed AA‟s with the EU would „have to suffer‟. The 
scale and nature of the financial and economic burdens for the EU and its EaP 
partners envisioned for this initial period during the implementation of the DCFTA 
have generated substantial concern. 
The fact that the economic scenarios of the Eastern Partnership have not 
been adequately thought through is indicative that this project is largely political in 
nature. In fact, this project led to, according to some experts, the emergence of the 
severe crisis in Ukraine (or, as others see it, at least had a substantial influence on 
it). In any case, the spark which lit the „Ukrainian fire‟ was Kiev‟s refusal to sign 
documents at the EaP summit in Vilnius. The situation in Moldova is also 
approaching the boiling point.  
This serves a yet another reminder that the full range of economic realities 
and issues must be taken into account whenever undertaking major endeavors. 
Naturally, this also entails careful analysis of the gains and losses from interaction 
with major external players.  
Ukraine is almost equally split in its economic orientation toward Russia and 
the Customs Union, on the one hand, and the European Union, on the other. All 
previous assessments of the economic effects of the Association Agreement for 
countries participating in the EaP have inadequately taken into consideration the 
rapid processes of Eurasian economic integration and the prospects for the 
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formation of the Eurasian Economic Union by 2015. They also have not paid much 
attention to the functioning of a full-fledged multilateral free trade zone in the CIS. 
The economic implications of continued instability in Ukraine have clearly 
been underestimated. In addition to dealing with the economic burden and needs of 
Ukraine, all economic relations between the two major components of Greater 
Europe — the European Union and the Customs Union-CIS — are under increased 
risks. Not only the scope of these economic relations is immense, it also has 
dimensions not measureable by volume or value. 
The worsening of the crisis in Ukraine and the introduction of sanctions are 
having additional consequences for Russian GDP growth. However, the clear 
slowing of the Russian economy also means a substantial weakening of domestic 
investment and consumer demand, which could hurt the interests of European 
business in Russia. 
Furthermore, according to the IMF, these factors could have an impact on 
the economies of European countries as well. In addition to unpleasant disruptions 
of natural gas flows, the negative impacts for these countries could come through 
trade and financial channels as well. For example, Cyprus, Austria and Hungary 
are at risk with their substantial banking assets in Russia and Ukraine (from 4% to 
13% of the GDP of these EU countries)
2
. 
In its economic forecast this spring, the European Commission highlighted 
the growing risks stemming from the slowing of the Russian economy, expansion 
of sanctions and the continued conflict in Ukraine for the Baltic republics, Finland, 
Cyprus, Bulgaria and Montenegro as well as Hungary, Poland and Ireland.
3
 
However, these forecasts do not yet take into consideration the consequences for 
the EU in the case of the need for mobilization of substantial financial resources to 
assist Ukraine in the near future or over the long term. 
                                                 
2
 Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe. Regional Economic Issues / IMF. April 2014, p. 11. 
3
 European Economic Forecast, Spring 2014 (European Economy 3/2014) / European 
Commission, pp. 4, 25. 
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Some financial and economic consequences of the crisis in Ukraine  
This report takes into consideration two options: (1) covering only the country‟s 
critical financing needs, (2) both critical needs and development needs. Here the 
development needs imply compensating the country‟s chronic underinvestment 
and providing for normal investment conditions in the mid-term perspective. 
The assessment of the critical financing needs for Ukraine in the coming 
years can only be an approximation due to the highly fluid situation in the country. 
At the same time, our analysis of the critical needs is based on the quantitative 
analysis of the country‟s balance of payments. 
For 2014 (and the period which follows) it is reasonable to consider two 
scenarios: the inertia (moderate) scenario and the negative scenario. There is no 
positive scenario, in our view. The inertia scenario foresees a gradual 
normalization of the situation, including of the Russian-Ukrainian relations, while 
the negative scenario involves a further worsening of the conflict. 
Trade balance. The calculations of Ukraine‟s trade balance in 2014 indicate 
a trade deficit of $5.6 billion according to the inertia scenario and $9 billion 
according to the negative scenario. 
International investment income. In 2014 the total financing needs of the 
Ukrainian government amount to approximately $20 billion. Only a portion of this sum 
will be serviced in 2014. With a rate of around 12% payments on servicing this debt 
will amount to approximately $1 billion. However, Ukraine‟s sovereign foreign debt is 
only the tip of the iceberg. The total volume of Ukraine‟s external debt as of January 1, 
2014, was $142.5 billion. Servicing this debt at a rate of around 8% requires 
currency reserves of approximately $12 billion per year, which together with the 
$1 billion mentioned above amounts to $13 billion for the year in the inertia scenario. 
It cannot be ruled out that foreign investors will choose not to reinvest 
income into the country‟s economy and instead will withdraw all investment 
returns from Ukraine. In this case the balance of investment income movement will 
reach a negative $16 billion. 
Migrant labor remittances and transfers. Income from labor migrants 
transferred to Ukraine is an important source of revenue which has helped stabilize 
the country‟s balance of payments for many years. Approximately 60—70% of 
these remittances come from migrant labors working in Russia. They fluctuate 
between $11—13 billion annually, representing approximately 7% of the country‟s 
GDP. The further worsening of relations with Russia could reduce this surplus to 
$8 billion annually in the inertia scenario and to $5 billion in the negative scenario. 
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Net capital movement. In the inertia (moderate) scenario with a rather rapid 
normalization of the situation net capital outflow in 2014 would reach a level of 
$6—10 billion (with $8 billion used hereinafter as the average). Considering the 
actual capital outflow trends and the size of the assets which belong to foreign 
investors in Ukraine, in the negative scenario the annual total could reach $22 billion. 
Ukraine’s critical (emergency) financing needs in 2014. External creditors 
will need to cover Ukraine‟s balance of payments deficit in an amount ranging 
from $4.5 billion to $28 billion with full depletion of the country‟s FX and gold 
reserves in both scenarios, or from $18.6 billion to $42 billion if the reserves are to 
be kept at the current level.  
For 2015—2018 the inertia scenario suggests a worsening of the trade 
balance as imports rise and exporters encounter problems on external markets. A 
further worsening of the situation with investment income movement is expected 
due to the substantial rise in Ukraine‟s foreign debt in 2014—2015 and the high 
cost of borrowing for the country on international capital markets. 
The required amount of financing over this period is estimated at 
approximately $85 billion. This is much higher than the expected volume of 
foreign economic aid and Ukrainian economy‟s capacity for mobilization of resources.  
When taking into consideration the volume of funds needed for investment 
for development, the following conclusion is reached: since 2005 the economy of 
Ukraine has received only half of the needed volume of investment and the 
aggregate underinvestment which has cumulated over the years is estimated to be 
around $300 billion. Indirectly this can be seeing in the level of depreciation of 
fixed assets, which over the past 12 years has grown from 44% to 78%. Without 
taking into account cumulative underinvestment, an acceptable level of investment 
for the period of 2014—2018 is approximately $190 billion. 
Estimate of possible reduction of Ukrainian exports to Russia and other 
Customs Union countries. The placement of emphasis on cooperation with EU 
countries creates risks for a substantial part of the Ukrainian economy which is 
oriented toward trade with Russia and other CIS countries. The hardest hit will be 
the machinery and technology sectors, which clearly are not capable of finding 
substitute markets domestically, in Europe or elsewhere. 
Additionally, cooperative relationships remain between enterprises in the 
CU countries and Ukraine in practically all resource processing industries. The most 
significant ties are in the machinery industry of Russia and Ukraine. One result of 
Ukraine‟s signing of the Association Agreement with the EU may be the gradual 
dismantling of projects in Ukraine‟s high-tech sector and an increasing number of 
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investment projects in Russia aimed at reducing dependence on imports from Ukraine. 
The minimum loss for the Ukrainian economy from this factor is 1.5—2% of its GDP. 
The structure of Ukraine‟s exports to the Customs Union and European 
Union is rather diversified. However, exports to the EU are dominated by 
resources and commodities, which account for 60% of the EU‟s imports from the 
country. For the Customs Union this figure is only 10%. 
Russia is by far the single largest recipient of Ukrainian exports. In 2013 
Russia accounted for 24% of Ukraine‟s exports, more than all of the next four 
countries combined — Turkey, China, Egypt and Poland — which accounted for 
6%, 4.3%, 4.3% and 4% respectively.  
According to our calculations done on Ukraine‟s 13 largest categories of 
exports to the Customs Union, substitute markets can only be found for 
approximately 15% of these exports. Considering the fact that these categories 
account for more than 75% of Ukraine‟s exports to the Customs Union, this level 
of substitution is probably representative for combined exports. 
This means that of the $19.2 billion in exports to the Customs Union in 2013, 
Ukraine is capable of redirecting to other market exports worth $2.9 billion. For the 
remaining $16.3 billion in exports (or 25.7% of the country‟s total exports in 2013) 
would be very difficult to find buyers outside the Customs Union. Of this amount, 
the portion of critically important supplies which the countries of the Customs Union 
would be reluctant to immediately decline is around $1—2 billion. These goods are 
primarily machinery and technology supplies mainly for the military-industrial complex. 
Thus, based on 2013 results, the maximum amount of export revenues which 
Ukraine could possibly lose with an acute worsening of relations with the Customs 
Union is $14.3—15.3 billion per year. 
Investment and business activities of Russian companies. Cumulative FDI 
from the CIS and Georgia in the Ukrainian economy at the beginning of 2013 
stood at $17 billion, with FDI from Russia accounting for $16.7 billion of this 
amount. Approximately 60% of Russian FDI in Ukraine is related to the services 
sector (primarily telecommunications and the financial sector). 
The Association Agreement with its rapid transition to the technical norms 
and standards of the European Union could become a hindrance to FDI originating 
from Russian, Kazakh and Belarussian companies whose businesses involve 
technological cooperation with Ukraine.  
In 2012, a relatively calm year for Ukraine and Russian-Ukrainian relations, 
growth in Russian FDI totaled approximately $2 billion. This amount can be 
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considered an opportunity cost for Ukraine (the lack of additional inflow of FDI 
from Russia each year) due to worsening of bilateral relations. 
Transit through Ukraine. The estimate of the maximum possible loss of 
income for Ukraine due to reduction of transit services provide to Russia 
(including the complete halting of Russian pipeline transit through Ukraine) is 
equal to the net amount of these services provided in 2013 — $3.7 billion with 
subsequent increases to $4.2 billion in 2014, $4.3 billion in 2015, $4.4 billion in 
2016, $4.5 billion in 2017 and $4.6 billion in 2018. 
Labor migration. An addition to the above mentioned authors‟ estimates, taking 
into consideration the unofficial (unlawful) living arrangements of a substantial 
portion of Ukrainian migrant workers and the possibility of more rigorous control 
by Russian authorities due to the worsening of relations, the minimum volume of 
remittances at risk is approximately $7—8 billion (4—5% of Ukraine‟s GDP).  
Trips by Russians to Ukraine. The potential decrease in trips to Ukraine and 
associated travel spending by Russian citizens can be estimated at 30—35% and at 
55—60% stemming from Crimea‟s move into Russian jurisdiction. The cost of this 
decline is estimated at $1.5—1.6 billion annually. However, there is a likelihood 
that the losses will be even greater due to the reduction in the average amount of 
time spent in the country and the corresponding amount of money spent per trip.  
The negative scenario and losses for Ukraine. In 2015—2016 the annual 
possible losses for Ukraine in such a scenario are estimated at average $33 billion, 
which is nearly double the aid package promised by the IMF for 2014—2015. 
During this period the most substantial risk for Ukraine stems from the 
reduction exports to Russia and other countries of the Customs Union: the 
maximum losses could reach $14.3—15.3 billion annually. This is followed by the 
risk of lower remittances from migrant workers ($7—8 billion annually), Russia‟s 
complete abandonment of pipeline transit through Ukraine ($3.9—4.2 billion 
depending on the year), continued high prices on natural gas from Russia (an 
additional $2.2—3.7 billion to the level of 2013 and depending on the year), 
opportunity lost on potential investments from Russia (approximately $2 billion 
annually), a sharp reduction in visits by Russian citizens to Ukraine ($1.5—1.6 
billion annually), the rejection by Russian companies of reciprocal transportation 
arrangements with Ukrainian operators (approximately $0.4 billion annually). 
For 2015—2018 the calculations include the full amount of the greatest 
possible losses for the first two years and, at least, half of the expected losses for 
the subsequent two-year period. Based on this (the full impact of the negative 
scenario in 2015—2016 and gradual recovery from this in 2017—2018), the total 
amount of losses for Ukraine could reach $100 billion. 
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Consequences for Russia  
In 2010—2013 Ukraine was in the 4th—6th position among Russia‟s trading 
partners. Since the start of this century its share has been in the range of 4.5—6% 
of Russian exports. The total sum of these exports to Ukraine reached a peak of 
$30.5 billion in 2010—2011 and contracted to $23.8 billion in 2013. 
The structure of Russian exports to Ukraine is more diversified than to other 
country, but energy remains the key — 59.2% in 2013. Other major export 
categories include machinery and equipment (9.1% in 2013) and chemicals (7.9%).  
Substitute export markets for Russia. According to calculations done on 
Russia‟s 14 largest categories, besides energy, substitute markets can be found for 
48% of its exports. These categories account for approximately 73% of Russia‟s 
non-energy export to Ukraine. Considering the relatively low level of marketability 
of other categories which were not covered, it would be reasonable to estimate that 
substitute markets could be found for 40—45% of Russia‟s non-energy exports. It 
is expected that substitute markets can be found for 100% of Russia‟s energy 
exports to Ukraine. 
Based on a total of $9.7 billion worth of non-energy exports to Ukraine in 
2013, Russia is capable of redirecting $3.9—4.4 billion in exports to other markets 
(and fully redirecting energy deliveries worth $14.1 billion). It follows that Russia 
will have a very difficult time selling the remaining export products worth $5.4—
5.8 billion (22.4—24.5% of Russia‟s total exports to Ukraine in 2013 or 1—1.1% 
of all exports). Critically important imports (primarily nuclear fuel cells as well as 
certain types of machinery products) amount to $1 billion. Thus, based on the trade 
level of 2013, the maximum losses for Russia total $4.5—5 billion annually. 
Substitution of imports from Ukraine. In case of the unfavorable 
development of relations between Russia and Ukraine, the following rough 
estimates can be made: 
- critically important imports over the next three years will amount to $2 
billion annually (components for the military industrial complex and a number of 
strategic machinery enterprises); 
- the remaining imports ($13.8 billion in 2013) are substituted: (1) through 
domestic production, the Crimean effect and reduction of noncritical imports — 
$4.3 billion (27% of all imports from Ukraine in 2013); (2) imports from the CIS 
— $1.9 billion (12%); (3) imports from other regions — $7.6 billion (48%); 
- the total additional costs on transport and the transit to substitute markets 
could amount to up to $2.6 billion.  
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Financial sector and property risks. The estimates take into account the 
possible failure of Ukraine to pay its debt to Russia, the placement of limitations 
on access to the deposits of Russian legal entities and individuals in Ukraine, and 
the seizure of Russian property in Ukraine. The maximum sum at risk (as of June 
2014) is $40—45 billion (without consideration of the debt of Ukrainian 
companies to Russian companies, including Naftogaz‟s debt to Gazprom). 
Reduction of labor resources from Ukraine. It should not be assumed 
outright that the Ukrainian workforce in Russia, estimated at ca. 2.5 million 
workers, can be relatively seamlessly substituted by other sources of imported and 
internal labor. This might not be the case. At least some short-term sizable 
disruptions of the labor market should be expected, with subsequent economic 
costs, which are hard to quantify outright. We can quantify, however, the loss for 
purchasing potential. The expenses of Ukrainian workers in Russia are estimated at 
$13—14 billion annually. Approximately $8—8.5 billion of this amount are at risk 
due to the potentially more rigorous enforcement of labor migration rules.  
In addition, there are other associated economic problems, for example, the 
defaulting on consumer loans provided to Ukrainians in Russia and the substitution 
of more professional and qualified workers from Ukraine by less qualified labor 
migrants from other post-Soviet countries, etc. Overall, the losses for Ukraine will 
be much more substantial than for Russia. However, Russia also has much to lose 
— and not only in quantitative terms but also in terms of the much-needed 
cooperation between enterprises and various sectors of Ukraine‟s economy, not to 
mention other qualitative costs. 
Economic risks for Moldova  
Moldova‟s financial and economic position is unstable. The current balance 
of payments deficit exceeds 5% of GDP (estimated to be 5.9% in 2014 and 6.4% in 
2015) and its total foreign debt is more than 80% of GDP.  
The CIS accounts for 35% of Moldova‟s foreign trade, with Russia receiving 
30% of all Moldovan exports. The country‟s main economic sectors, including its 
agricultural exports, remain very highly focused on the markets of Russia and the 
Customs Union. 
The negative scenario for exports to Russia and the Customs Union. Even 
without considering the worst case scenario, exports to Russia could fall by one-
half, with exports to other countries of Customs Union declining by 30%. After 
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2015, exports to Russia and the Customs Union as a whole could start growing, 
albeit weakly. 
As a result, from 2014 to 2018 Moldova‟s cumulative export volume to the 
Customs Union will likely amount to only $2.5 billion, with Russia accounting for 
$2 billion. The decline in exports to Russia and other countries of the Customs 
Union can only partially be compensated by an increase in exports to the EU and 
other markets. Exports to the EU could potentially increase by $500 million while 
other markets could absorb another $200 million. In such a scenario, Moldova 
faces a loss of approximately $1.4 billion in exports over 2014—2018 
(approximately 18% of the country‟s GDP in 2013). 
Risks for migrant labor remittances. Tightened immigration and labor 
control in Russia could put at risk approximately 40% of Moldova‟s annual 
transfers by migrant workers in Russia, which translates into $1.2—1.3 billion 
(15—16% of Moldova‟s GDP in 2013). 
Problems with natural gas contracts with Russia. The cumulative debt of 
Moldova and Transnistria to Gazprom as of the end of 2013 totaled nearly $5.2 
billion, with Transnistria accounting for $4.7 billion of this sum. Moldova is 
paying for most of its current supplies, but its debt is increasing and new arrears 
are accumulating. Transnistria has not paid for any natural gas delivered since 
2009 and is not servicing its debt.  
Investment activity of Russian companies. Cumulative Russian FDI in 
Moldova at the beginning of 2013 totaled $562 million. The distribution of this 
investment largely reflects the structure of the Moldovan economy: machinery, 
agriculture and energy industries (38%), communication, IT and infrastructure 
networks (32%), wholesale and retail trade (18%), education, finance and tourism (12%). 
A slowing of growth in cumulative FDI from Russia has been observed for 
the following reasons: the small size of the Moldovan economy, the country‟s 
unstable financial condition due to various deficits and a high level of foreign debt, 
the complicated political situation in and around the country, and uncertainty 
regarding Moldova‟s integration prospects and what obligations the country may 
assume before signing the AA. The strong position of Russian business in key 
infrastructure and industrial sectors of Moldova presents certain risks for the 
country in light of the abovementioned trends, up to and including the withdrawal 
of Russian business from certain projects if the situation develops along an 
unfavorable track. 
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A new platform for cooperation in Greater Europe 
In the case of a gradual resolution of the conflict in and around Ukraine, 
Russia has no compelling reason to reject economic cooperation with Kiev. One of 
the key tasks will be to develop a mechanism for information exchange which 
allows for effective control of goods‟ supplies from Ukraine within the existing 
free trade regime while, if necessary, also allowing for application of a reservation 
for protective measures for the Customs Union stipulated in Appendix 6 of the 
Treaty of October 18, 2011. In parallel the groundwork should be laid for a long-
term solution for the establishment of a sufficient set of trade regimes between the 
Eurasian Economic Union, Ukraine and the European Union. 
The Ukrainian crisis has created a situation in which internal and external 
stakeholders and observers are best served by finding a solution which creates a 
legal framework for economic reconstruction and political stabilization of the 
Ukrainian state. This can be achieved while moving forward on the path toward 
economic agreements between Ukraine, the European Union and the Eurasian 
Economic Union. 
The long-term objective is to build mutually beneficial and joint sets of 
agreements for a trilateral partnership of the EU, Ukraine and the EEU. These 
agreements, in our view, should go beyond a simplistic free trade zone regimes and 
include more profound and comprehensive agreements, including between the EU 
and the EEU. Due to the structure of their foreign trade, the countries of the EEU 
are not interested in a simple agreement introducing free trade on goods: in their 
interest is to achieve a comprehensive agreement providing for deep economic 
integration which would encompass dozens of different issues. 
Among these issues are: trade of goods; rules for e-trade; elimination of non-
tariff barriers; free movement of capital; liberalization of access to financial 
markets; regulatory convergence (norms and standards); intellectual property 
rights; mutual recognition of diplomas, including for professional education; visa-
free travel, including readmission agreements; the Kaliningrad region; 
neighborhood programs for border regions; massive educational exchange 
programs (Erasmus Mundus and others); development of international transport 
infrastructure (automotive and rail corridors); the Third Energy Package; creation 
of a common electricity market; establishing rules for economic competition; and 
mechanisms for conflict mediation.  
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In the short-term perspective it would be useful to sign several documents.  
 Ukraine and the EEU should sign a protocol on the elimination of 
technical trade barriers. The signing of such a protocol is stipulated in 
a December 17, 2012 Agreement between the Customs Union and 
countries of the CIS outside the Customs Union. Ukraine and the EEU 
should sign a document on the electronic exchange of customs 
declaration information.  
 The two parties should also sign protocol on a mechanism for joint 
control over the origin of goods which would make the supplier liable 
for any falsification of such information. 
Such agreements along with the existing CIS free trade agreement and other 
agreements stipulating Ukraine‟s obligations in other areas (the use of national 
currencies in settlements, guarantees of investor rights, agreements on investment 
projects) should become an indelible part of an international plan to rebuild the 
Ukrainian economy with the participation of Russia, the EU, the US, international 
financial institutions and other donors.  
